Bridging Threat Models and Detections: Formal Verification via CADP

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September 17, 2025
Working Formal Methods Symposium 2025

The Problem

- ▶ Detection rules (SIEM/EDR/IDS) are written in diverse DSLs.
- ► Threat intelligence uses attack trees, ATT&CK, and IoCs—mostly informal.
- ▶ **Gap:** No formal assurance that rules *cover* the intended threat behavior.


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Goal

Formally verify conformance between high-level threat models and executable detection logic.

Key Idea



Contributions

- 1. Compositional LTS semantics for attack trees and GTDL.
- 2. Semantics-preserving translations to LNT.
- 3. Automated conformance checking (bisimulation, weak trace inclusion).
- 4. **Tooling:** CLI pipeline from models to CADP verification.
- 5. **Evaluation:** Real-world malware (LokiBot, Emotet) + parametric scalability.


Attack Trees (AT)

- ▶ Hierarchical decomposition of an attacker goal into subgoals.
- ► Constructors: **LEAF**, **OR**, **AND** (unordered), **SAND** (sequential).
- Denote a finite set of traces over atomic actions.

Trace Semantics

$$\mathcal{T}(\mathrm{LEAF}_a) = \{a\}, \qquad \mathcal{T}(\mathrm{OR}(\dots)) = \bigcup \mathcal{T}(\cdot)$$
 $\mathcal{T}(\mathrm{AND}(\dots)) = \| \text{ (shuffle)}, \qquad \mathcal{T}(\mathrm{SAND}(\dots)) = \cdot \text{ (concat)}$

Lokibot Attack Tree




GTDL: Generic Threat Detection Language

- Declarative rules over event streams with stateful conditions.
- Building blocks: assignments, plugin calls, IF/THEN/ELSE, action GlobalFlag.Set("D").
- Execution model: many rules run in parallel, re-evaluated per event.

Observable event: the detection action (Set("D")) becomes label d.

GTDL



Use Case: System-Level (Lokibot)

```
[DETECTION]
Detection_name = 'LokibotProcess'
Apply_when = "Process"
[RULE]
v_process := inPluginCall(IsProcessName, "ytpgwim");
v_location := inPluginCall(IsInProcessPath, "%TEMP%");
IF v_process AND v_location THEN
    GlobalFlag.Set("LokibotProcess");
END IF
```

Composite Signature (Correlation)

```
[DETECTION]
Detection name = 'LokibotIncident'
Apply_when = "GlobalFlags"
[RULE]
flag1 := GlobalFlag. IsSet("LokibotProcess"):
flag2 := GlobalFlag. IsSet ("BotExtensions");
flag3 := GlobalFlag. IsSet ("TempRunKey"):
flag4 := GlobalFlag. IsSet ("KnownCCAccesed");
IF flag1 AND flag2 AND flag3 AND flag4 THEN
  GlobalFlag. Set ("LokibotIncident"):
END IF
```

$\mathsf{AT} \to \mathsf{LNT}$ (Sketch)

- ▶ **LEAF**: emits non-silent action.
- ▶ **OR**: nondeterministic choice.
- **AND**: parallel composition.
- **SAND**: sequential composition.

Correctness

For any AT A: $Traces(tr(A)) = \mathcal{T}(A)$.

$\mathsf{GTDL} \to \mathsf{LNT}$

- Plugin-assigned variables become process parameters.
- Boolean logic and control flow map homomorphically to LNT.
- ▶ GlobalFlag.Set("D") \mapsto output on channel dSet.
- Multiple signatures → parallel composition.

Theorem (Trace Preservation)

For any GTDL rule P: $Traces(\mathcal{T}(P)) = [\![P]\!]_{GTDL}$.

From GTDL to LNT — Side by Side

GTDL

```
[DETECTION] Name='LokibotProcess'
[RULE]
v_process = inPluginCall(IsProcessName, "yptgwim");
v_location = inPluginCall(IsInProcessPath, "%TEMP%");
IF v_process AND v_location THEN
GlobalFlag.Set("LokibotProcess");
END IF
```

LNT

```
process LokibotProcess [flag:FLAG_CHANNEL]
  (in var pname, ppath:String) is
  if pname == "yptgwim" and ppath == "%TEMP%" then
   flag(TRUE)
  end if
end process
```

Common Alphabet & Channels

- ▶ Both AT and GTDL models emit on the *same* observable channels.
- ▶ Internal steps in GTDL become τ (silent) actions.
- ► Enables CADP to decide: strong/weak simulation, (bi)simulation, (weak) trace (inclusion/equivalence).

Equivalences & Inclusions

- **Strong bisimulation:** strict stepwise matching (often too strong).
- **Weak bisimulation:** abstracts away τ .
- ► Trace equivalence/inclusion: focus on observable detections.

Interpretation

- ▶ *Inclusion* (AT \subseteq DET): no false negatives.
- **Equivalence**: no false negatives nor over-approximation.

Toolchain

- ▶ tree2lnt.py: AT $(YAML) \rightarrow LNT$
- ▶ gtdl2lnt.py: GTDL → LNT
- verify.sh: compile, minimize, run bisimulator
- ▶ measure_times.py: benchmark orchestration

Case Studies (Examples)

- ► **LokiBot:** AND-structured actions; observational equivalence achieved.
- **Emotet:** mixed AND/SAND; iterative refinement; inclusion holds.

Outcome

Framework flags semantic mismatches and guides signature refinement.

Case Study: LokiBot Tree

Case Study: LokiBot Detection

```
process Engine [lokiBotProcSet, lokiBotExtset,
   lokiBotTempRunKev:FLAG_CHANNEL, lokiBotDet:any] is
loop
par
LokibotProcess [lokiBotProcSet] ("vptgwim", "%TEMP%")
| LokibotExtension [lokiBotExtset] (".exe")
| LokiTempExeRunKey [lokiBotTempRunKey] ("Run", "Run")
| LokiDetection [lokiBotProcSet, lokiBotExtset, lokiBotTempRunKey,
        lokiBotDetl
end par
end loop
end process
```

Parametric/Scalability Results

Setup. Attack trees & detection models with varying size and operators. Findings.

- ► **AND-only:** weaktrace faster than observational.
- **SAND-only:** linear growth, similar times.
- ▶ **OR-only:** linear growth, both options feasible.
- ▶ Mixed AND-OR, AND-SAND: verification cost depends on operator mix.

Assumptions & Limitations

- Assurance depends on quality of attack trees.
- ► Current method is not anomaly-based; zero-days outside the model may evade.
- Extensions: automated AT and Detection synthesis, extended semantics for plugins.

Conclusion

- ▶ Unified semantic domain (LNT) for threats and detections.
- Automated conformance with CADP (bisimulation, weak trace inclusion).
- ▶ Validated on real malware and scalable synthetics.

Takeaway

Formal verification can systematically reveal detection blind spots and guide refinement before deployment.

Thank you for your attention! Q&A